Este ensaio trata da passagem da noção de um self de representação, forjada na modernidade, a partir de Descartes, para a concepção de uma consciência ecológica, impregnada e situada no espaço e no tempo. A noção de consciência incorporada é objeto de estudos por parte da hermenêutica contemporânea e das ciências cognitivas. Entre os estudiosos desse tema, destacam-se Gallagher, Marcel, Taylor e Hutto, entre outros.

Este artigo defende a necessidade da _sabedoria_ _prática _(_phronesis_) para lidar com os desafios e limites éticos decorrentes dos avanços tecnológicos atualmente. Trata-se de um tipo de racionalidade que se ocupa em deliberar bem sobre os _fins_ das ações humanas e julgar se eles são bons ou maus e, mediante isso, fazer opções por valores_._ Assim, a racionalidade prática diz respeito ao agir humano em sentido pleno, que tem a ver com a esfera do _dever-ser_, _dos valores, do sentido da (...) vida_ e das grandes escolhas existenciais humanas. Para isso, o artigo aborda algumas questões relevantes para o debate em _filosofia da tecnologia_, a saber: a ideia de que a tecnologia não é redutível à ciência aplicada, mas se constitui como um conhecimento específico; a distinção do conceito de técnica e tecnologia; a dimensão política da tecnologia; e por fim, a necessidade de pensar uma racionalidade ética que oriente o agir humano no mundo contemporâneo. (shrink)

Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean (...) and the Kantian instantiation of that model fail to account for the internal connection between normative and motivating reasons required by internalism. The two classes of reasons rather come to be seen as mutually exclusive. Opposing the belief‐desire model, I argue that rational motivation can only be established by reference to emotion. Emotions are affective perceptions. They have motivational force so that they can contribute to the explanation of action. At the same time they can rationalise actions because they have an intentional content which resembles the content of sensory perception in being representational. Because of this, the emotions can noninferentially justify judgements, which in turn can justify actions. I conclude by outlining the Aristotelian account of practical reason and ethics that emerges from integrating the emotions into practical reasoning. Doing the right thing is much more a matter of seeing things right than of drawing the right inferences. Seeing things right, in its turn, is not only to justify an action: it necessarily implies to be motivated to act accordingly. (shrink)

The question is why it is that objective safety level and subjective feeling of safety may come apart. Answering this question requires an analysis of the nature of fear in the public sphere since feeling safe means to feel that one avoids the frightening, i.e. the threats or dangers that one perceives in the world. Döring argues that the fact-resistance fear might display in the public sphere is due to the characteristic function that fear fulfills in this sphere. In the (...) public sphere, fear is typically embodied by “fear narratives,” i.e. by real-life structuring stories of local groups which thereby respond to feelings of powerless fear and insecurity. By specifying what the threat is and how to deal with it in the right way, fear narratives reduce felt insecurity. Because of this and by thus enabling a feeling of superiority which may even turn the fear narrative into a narrative of enthusiastic heroism, fear in the public sphere does itself satisfy subjective preferences. This is why objective safety level and subjective feeling of safety may come apart. The question is how we could and should handle this. (shrink)

In hoping, what is important to us seems possible, which makes our life appear meaningful and motivates us to do everything within our reach to bring about the things that we hope for. I argue that it can be rational to rely on one’s hope: hope can deceive us, but it can also represent things correctly to us. I start with Philip Pettit’s view that hope is a cognitive resolve. I reject this view and suggest instead that hope is an (...) emotion: hope is a felt evaluation for which we can define a corresponding character trait which in its turn qualifies as a virtue if it is felt whenever its correctness conditions are satisfied. For religious hope in particular it follows from my analysis that, if I believe, I may hope. (shrink)

I argue that, in experiencing a recalcitrant emotion, one does not violate a rational requirement of any sort. Rational requirements, as the expression has come to be used, are requirements of coherence. Accordingly, my argument is that there is nothing incoherent in any way about experiencing a recalcitrant emotion. One becomes incoherent only if one allows the emotion to influence one's reasoning and/or action, in which case one violates the ‘consistency principle’ and/or the ‘enkratic principle’. From the standpoint of rationality, (...) it would even be counterproductive to put subjects under the obligation that their emotional experiences and their evaluative judgements must always fit together. When we nevertheless intuitively sense that the subject is irrational in experiencing a recalcitrant emotion this is in cases in which the emotion challenges the subject's agential identity. However, emotions can, but need not, challenge one's agential identity, and, furthermore, perceptions can do so as well. In any case, challenges of this kind do not involve the violation of a rational requirement. (shrink)

In this book, I discuss the question whether God exists, not as a Tillichian religious symbol, but as an actual person, albeit a person who is very different from you and me. My procedure is to examine arguments bdth for and against God's existence qua person and to assess their relative merits. I shall try to show that there is more evidence that God exists than that he does not. This position is, of course, rejected nowadays, even by most religious (...) thinkers, who hold, for one reason or another, that evidence has nothing to do with religious belief, properly understood. My reply to these thinkers is simply to ask them to examine what follows. A useful companion to Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, and the Appendix of this book would be Alvin Plantinga's The Nature of Necessity.l Though I avoid technical terminology wherever possible, those chapters presuppose an elementary understanding of 'possible worlds' discourse; and a clear and concise explanation of that terminology can be found in Chapter IV of Plantinga's book. Also, I use 'logical' throughout to mean what Plantinga means by 'broadly logical' on page 2 of The Nature of Necessity. (shrink)

Resumo: O presente artigo visa apresentar, sistematizar e analisar, à luz da teoria social crítica, as ações desenvolvidas pelo NESEF (Núcleo de Estudos e Pesquisas sobre o Ensino de Filosofia) ao longo de duas décadas de existência na Universidade Federal do Paraná - UFPR. Procura situar e referenciar as diferentes atividades desenvolvidas coletivamente no campo da pesquisa e da extensão. Parte do entendimento que a Filosofia só é Filosofia à medida que ela se nega e, por conseguinte, se realiza; e (...) ela só se realiza na prática social, cultural e política na e através da ação coletiva. Pretende mostrar o conjunto de ações desenvolvidas (em rede) pelo NESEF que, com o passar do tempo, assume a condição de “intelectual orgânico-coletivo”. Por se tratar de uma descrição de atividades estreitamente ligadas à atuação do autor, o texto revelará sua trajetória profissional entrelaçada ao seu “jeito de caminhar” diante dos embates teórico-práticos do campo acadêmico formando, assim, um contínuo movimento de ondas tensas (laços e nós) que encontraram na ação conjunta – na práxis coletiva – um terreno fértil. Palavras-chave: NESEF; Intelectual Orgânico; Educação Filosófica The NESEF as an organic-collective intellectual: from head to toe Abstract: This article aims to present, systematize and analyze, in the light of critical social theory, the actions developed by NESEF (Center for Studies and Research on Philosophy Teaching) over two decades at the Federal University of Paraná – UFPR. It seeks to point out and reference the different activities developed collectively in the field of research and extension. It is considered that Philosophy is Philosophy only insofar as it negates itself and, consequently, realizes itself; and it is only realized in social, cultural and political practice in and through collective action. It is intended to show the set of actions developed (in a network) by the NESEF which, over time, assumes the condition of “organic-collective intellectual”. As it is a description of activities closely linked to the author's work, the text reveals his professional trajectory intertwined with his "way of walking" in the face of theoretical-practical clashes in the academic field, thus forming a continuous movement of tense waves (ties and knots) that found fertile ground in joint action – in collective praxis. Key words: NESEF; Organic Intellectual; Philosophical Education Le NESEF comme intellectuel organique-collectif : de la tête aux pieds Résumé: Cet article vise à présenter, systématiser et analyser, à la lumière de la théorie sociale critique, les actions développées par le NESEF (Centre d'Études et de Recherche sur l'Enseignement de la Philosophie) pendant deux décennies à l'Université Fédérale du Paraná – UFPR. Il cherche à situer et référencer les différentes activités développées collectivement dans le domaine de la recherche et de l'extension. Il est entendu que la Philosophie n'est la Philosophie qu'en tant qu'elle se nie elle-même et, par conséquent, se réalise; et elle ne se réalise que dans la pratique sociale, culturelle et politique dans et par l'action collective. Il vise à montrer l'ensemble des actions développées (en réseau) par la NESEF qui, au fil du temps, assume la condition d'« intellectuel organique-collectif ». Comme il s'agit d'une description d'activités étroitement liées au cours de travail de l'auteur, le texte révèle sa trajectoire professionnelle entrelacé à sa "façon de marcher" face aux affrontements théoriques-pratiques du champ académique, formant ainsi un mouvement continu d'ondes tendues (liens et nœuds) qui ont trouvé un terreau fertile dans l'action commune – c'est à dire, dans la praxis collective. Mots clés: NESEF; Intellectuel Organique; Éducation Philosophique Data de registro: 23/01/2023 Data de aceite: 18/10/2023. (shrink)

Neste texto, refletimos acerca da educação escolar no meio rural brasileiro estabelecendo interface com os direitos humanos. Para alcançar este objetivo, fazemos uma retrospectiva histórica da educação oferecida pelo Estado à população rural, demonstrando que sistematicamente tem sido direito negado do ponto de vista do acesso, da continuidade e da qualidade social do ensino. Contudo, com o processo de democratização da sociedade na década de 1980 e da emergência de movimentos sociais, é reivindicado o direito universal à educação consignado na (...) Constituição Federal de 1988 como “direito de todos e dever do Estado”. A partir de meados de 1990, uma política educacional contra-hegemônica é construída por um conjunto de atores coletivos, constituindo o Movimento Nacional de Educação do Campo, denominada de Educação do Campo. Se a grande conquista reside no marco regulatório no qual se pode visualizar uma educação que considera a identidade, especificidade e diversidade dos sujeitos do campo, isso não significa a garantia desses direitos. Do ponto de vista metodológico, a abordagem analítica desta reflexão se orienta pela perspectiva epistemológica do materialismo histórico, tendo por base de pesquisa elementos da legislação educacional brasileira e o diálogo com autores que apontam para novos horizontes da educação como direito social. Como resultado desta investigação, apontamos desafios a serem enfrentados, entre eles o consórcio dos entes federados nem sempre afinado no cumprimento do marco regulatório da Educação do Campo; poucas iniciativas de formação inicial e continuada específica para professores da Educação do Campo; estrutura material precária das escolas; o material didático-pedagógico contempla conteúdos descontextualizados e inadequados às peculiaridades locais, às vivências e necessidades dos usuários da escola; ausência de Projeto Político Pedagógico, Currículo e calendário escolar capazes de, ao mesmo tempo, dar conta de oferecer o conhecimento socialmente produzido pela humanidade e atender a diversidade, especificidade dos sujeitos com direito ao acesso à escola onde vivem e uma educação omnilateral, que não dissocia a formação humana e profissional. Concluímos identificando uma profunda brecha entre o marco regulatório da Educação do Campo conquistado e a garantia real de uma educação cidadã e profissional de qualidade a ser ofertada à população do campo. Palavras chave: Educação do Campo. Direitos Humanos. Política Pública. (shrink)

O trabalho é um exercício de pensamento referente ao lugar da filosofia no currículo do ensino médio. A investigação considera a recente presença da filosofia como disciplina obrigatória em todas as séries da escola média brasileira. Assim, a condição curricular, e o próprio lugar do docente são ainda uma lacuna a ser preenchida. Para essa “atividade” as provocações de Hannah Arendt e de Gilles Deleuze figuram como o solo conceitual da reflexão.O exercício intelectual de Arendt sobre o “vazio de pensamento” (...) e sua rigorosa análise sobre a faculdade de pensar articuladas com as provocações de Deleuze quanto a compreensão da filosofia como uma “produtora” e articuladora de conceitos, ditaram o caminho que sugere ser a filosofia, enquanto “disciplina”, um parar para pensar como forma de contrapor o pensar ao fluxo laboral de consumo de conteúdos da escola média. Aqui a filosofia enquanto disciplina é uma contemplação tão ativa quanto a ação. (shrink)

Rosenberg was a chronicler and a good one, yet much of his inner dialogue was not with the present so much as the omnipresent artistic past. The central question, posed early in his life, concerned a man's individuality. Dostoyevsky had called it his "dearest" possession. At no time, even in his Marxist youth, did Rosenberg relinquish his vision of the individual as the central, most important player in any drama. Rosenberg was positively possessed with Dostoyevsky's doubts. One can hear the (...) rant of the man from the underground repeatedly in Rosenberg's written works—the stubborn hero who maintains the right even to be absurd and to "desire for himself what is positively harmful and stupid" if he claims it as a right. The right of the individual to live up to man's nature which, as Dostoyevsky said, "acts as one whole, with everything in it, conscious or unconscious" was Rosenberg's most consistent ideal. The individual he most admired, both in himself and in others, was the artist. But only in spite of everything. No one was more alert to the tartufferie that bedevils the world of the artist. Rosenberg craved sincerity with the same kind of passion for it he had found in Dostoyevsky. Art and artifact would not be a substitute for ethics and hard thought. Rosenberg's deepest conviction is revealed in his 1960 essay, "Literary Form and Social Hallucination," which begins with Dostoyevsky complaining about literature that does not lead to truth. Dore Ashton, professor of art history at The Cooper Union, is the author of numerous works, includingArt Before Columbus, Poets and the Past, A Reading Of Modern Art, and, most recently, A Fable of Modern Art. Her previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, "No More than an Accident?" appeared in the Winter 1976 issue. (shrink)

Almost all contemporary philosophers on the subject agree that emotions play an indispensable role in the justification (as opposed to the mere causation) of other mental states and actions. However, how this role is to be understood is still an open question. At the core of the debate is the phenomenon of conflict without contradiction: why is it that an emotion need not be revised in the light of better judgment and knowledge? Conflict without contradiction has been explained either by (...) difference in content between emotion and judgment, or by a difference in the respective attitude towards content. I argue that conflict without contradiction is due to both differences, where difference in content is prior to difference in attitude. (shrink)

There is no set Δ of probability axioms that meets the following three desiderata: (1) Δ is vindicated by a Dutch book theorem; (2) Δ does not imply regularity (and thus allows, among other things, updating by conditionalization); (3) Δ constrains the conditional probability q(·,z) even when the unconditional probability p(z) (=q(z,T)) equals 0. This has significant consequences for Bayesian epistemology, some of which are discussed.

In the modern mind the circumstance of Jewishness has been burdened with many questionable associations, particularly in the arts. Although Harold Rosenberg writes that, "in regard to art, being Jewish appears to be no more than an accident,"1 vulgar associations of Jews with art stubbornly subsist, an extreme example being Nixon's "now the worst thing is to go to anything that has to do with the arts . . . the arts, you know—they're Jews, they're left wing—in other words, stay (...) away. . . ."2 Despite the recurrence of such cloudy associations, the issue has remained curiously submerged. It is commonplace in our century to find a kind of reflexive yoking of Jews with art, particularly avant-garde art. The incalculable effects of such attitudes on modern art itself are rarely weighted. Accidental as the Jewish artist may be in his own view, he remains a somewhat suspect accident in the eyes of others. Can we continue to regard the fact of being a modern Jewish artist as "accidental," or is there a significant context which must be acknowledged? · 1. Harold Rosenberg, "Jews in Art," The New Yorker, 22 December 1975.· 2. Nixon to Haldeman: Watergate tapes, Newsweek, 19 August 1974. Dore Ashton, professor of art history at The Cooper Union, has served as the curator of art exhibitions both in the United States and abroad and as an art critic for The New York Times. She is author of, among others,Art Before Columbus, Poets and the Past, The Unknown Shore, A Reading of Modern Art, The New York School: A Cultural Reckoning, and Yes But...A Critical Study of Philip Guston. She has also contributed "On Harold Rosenberg" to Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

O texto apresenta um série de provocações diante da situação de obrigatoriedade do ensino de filosofia no nível médio da educação brasileira. A grande questão levantada é sobre a própria identidade da filosofia e do filosofar no ensino médio. A tensão entre a reflexão viva da filosofia e a tradição fica expressa na conturbada construção do lugar da filosofia no ensino médio brasileiro.

Tendo como recorte certa produção da intelligentsia brasileira, a obra analisa a recepção da filosofia nietzschiana no período de 1922 a 1945, trazendo à luz um aspecto para o qual poucos pesquisadores atentam. Na literatura, modernistas como Mário de Andrade e Manuel Bandeira, e no registro ensaístico- sociológico, sobretudo Paulo Prado, Gilberto Freyre e Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, teriam recorrido ao pensamento de Nietzsche, em maior ou menor escala, nas suas produções.

Resumo: Tendo em conta que 2020 foi o ano de celebração do centenário de nascimento de Celso Furtado, como singela homenagem, neste artigo procuramos oferecer uma introdução preliminar sobre a recepção da filosofia de Nietzsche na obra do economista brasileiro. Celso Furtado é um dos pensadores mais influentes no campo da economia-política na América Latina. Mas ninguém ainda pesquisou a dimensão filosófica de seu pensamento. Não obstante, é possível discorrer que ele pensou a economia sob um ponto de vista crítico-filosófico. (...) Para comprovar essa hipótese, pretendemos evidenciar três aspectos conceituais por ele apropriados da filosofia de Nietzsche. São eles: a criatividade e/ou criação, para pensar o seu papel como agente motor de desenvolvimento da civilização industrial; a transvaloração de todos os valores, para pensar a relevância dos valores morais para os centros de decisões dos meios e dos fins da produção e distribuição do capital; e o perspectivismo, para pensar a economia como uma totalidade composta por múltiplas perspectivas estruturais.: Taking into account that 2020 was the year of celebration of the centenary of Celso Furtado's birth, as a simple tribute, in this article we seek to offer a preliminary introduction on the reception of Nietzsche's philosophy in the work of the Brazilian economist. Celso Furtado is one of the most influential thinkers in the field of political economy in Latin America. But no one has yet researched his philosophical dimension of thought. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that he thought economics from a critical-philosophical point of view. To prove this hypothesis, we intend to highlight three conceptual aspects that he appropriated from Nietzsche's philosophy. They are: creativity and / or creation, to think about its role as a driving agent for the development of industrial civilization; the transvalue of all values, to think about the relevance of moral values to the decision-making centers of the means and ends of capital production and distribution; and perspectivism, to think of the economy as a totality composed of multiple structural perspectives. (shrink)

Der wissenschaftliche Diskurs soll zugleich „epistemisch gerecht“ und „epistemisch offen“ sein. Alle potentiell Erkennenden sollen die gleiche Freiheit haben, am Diskurs teilzunehmen, und dabei freimütig sprechen können. Auf diese Weise wird Wissen bzw. Erkenntnis bestmöglich erreicht. So selbstverständlich das klingen mag, ist eine heftige, frustrierend verlaufende Debatte darüber entbrannt, wer und was an der Universität gehört oder gelesen werden soll – und wer und was nicht. In diesem Essay werden zunächst die Gründe für diesen Verlauf offengelegt. Sodann wird ein Vorschlag (...) dazu gemacht, wie sich die beiden nur scheinbar konfligierenden Ziele der epistemischen Gerechtigkeit und der epistemischen Offenheit miteinander versöhnen lassen. Danach gibt es für Meinungsäußerungen, sofern sie epistemisch qualifiziert sind, keine Grenze. Wissenschaft darf sich nicht nur, sie muss sich sogar mit jedem erdenklichen Thema auseinandersetzen, da gerade sie mögliche epistemische Irrwege mit guten Argumenten beenden kann. Das Argument und der Dialog, und nicht Zensur aufgrund „sozialer Tyrannei“, sind der Weg der Wissenschaft und ihr schärfstes Schwert. (shrink)

A primeira parte deste artigo mostra que tanto A. Philonenko quanto T. Rockomore, cada um a seu modo e por vias bastante distintas, parecem relativizar a importância dos ‘princípios’ da Doutrina da ciência. Num caso como no outro, em termos muito gerais, talvez pudéssemos dizer que a relação Kant-Fichte seria avaliada em função da dialética da primeira Crítica, tanto porque o uso da lógica geral como órganon só pode ser dialético, quanto porque a natureza hipotética da argumentação de Fichte deve (...) nos levar a uma interpretação não fundacionista de sua Doutrina-da-ciência. A segunda parte deste trabalho, em contraposição a essas leituras, analisara três textos de Fichte a fim de indicar que seria possível defender uma intepretação da Doutrina-da-ciência como uma espécie de aprofundamento da transcendentalização da lógica operada por Kant na primeira Crítica. Essa análise, nos limites deste trabalho, só poderá ser indicativa e esquemática; mas isso não impede, a meu ver, que ela possa sugerir uma chave frutífera para desenvolvimentos futuros. (shrink)

: In the past five years, China has experienced increased efforts to regulate activities in biomedical research and practice. Background is provided on some of the key developments in Chinese bioethics especially in relation to genetics, stem cells, cloning, and reproductive medicine. This background sets the stage for a document entitled "Ethical Guidelines for Human Embryo Stem Cell Research," proposed by the Bioethics Committee of the Southern China National Human Gene Research Center, Shanghai, which is reprinted in this volume of (...) the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal. (shrink)

The arendtian research, with its “sui generis” style of topicing the politcs and pointing out political’s perplexities, it require our eyes one perception its researcheness logical. We are calling this logical as “tension”, it’s one hermeneutic conception which helps us in the comprehension of his work’s political reasonableness. It has been presented in its many political approaches.

A necessidade de homens e mulheres de fé esclarecida e bem fundamentada na política tornou-se preponderante na contemporaneidade. Vive-se em um contexto em que muitos perderam a esperança e não acreditam mais na política. Na perspectiva cristã, a fé se traduz na prática do amor e é alimentada pela esperança. Não é possível sonhar com uma qualidade de vida melhor, em âmbito pessoal e coletivo, se não houver pessoas de fé na política, imbuídas dessa missão. O Movimento Nacional Fé e (...) Política – MF&P, criado em 1989, e constituído por grupos de pessoas atuantes em comunidades eclesiais, movimentos populares, partidos políticos, sindicatos e outros espaços de organização social, surgiu para promover estratégias em favor da justiça social e da dignidade humana. O trabalho é feito através da reflexão, da celebração, do aprofundamento e estudo, em grupos, seminários, retiros e encontros, tendo como lema principal, atualmente, a Cultura do Bem-Viver. O objetivo deste trabalho, a partir do material bibliográfico do MF&P e de outros pesquisadores, foi analisar o contexto do nascimento e o desenvolvimento do MF&P no Brasil. Para isso, identificou a produção editorial e o histórico dos encontros e seminários, das fases do movimento, chegando à época atual, quando, a partir de 2011, o movimento incluiu a Cultura do Bem-Viver como novo horizonte ético e político. A metodologia utilizada foi a revisão de literatura e análise do material publicado de forma impressa e também na forma digital, no site do movimento, e em publicações de membros que fazem parte do MF&P. Pode-se concluir que, através de sua história, das publicações e dos encontros regionais e nacionais, o movimento abriu perspectivas sobre novas formas de se fazer política, que contemplam e reforçam a atenção para com a ética, o cuidado, a dignidade e a justiça social. É um movimento dinâmico que contribui como um caminho para uma nova sociedade que possa usufruir de seus direitos fundamentais. (shrink)

Können unsere Gefühle uns Gründe dafür liefern, etwas für wahr zu halten und zu tun? Verfügen wir über bestimmte Werte und moralische Überzeugungen vielleicht sogar nur kraft unserer Gefühle? Entgegen der philosophischen Tradition, in der die Gefühle überwiegend als irrational und subjektiv abgetan wurden, zielt der vorliegende Sammelband auf den Nachweis, dass die Gefühle einen integralen und unverzichtbaren Bestandteil rationalen Urteilens und Handelns bilden. Neben der Darstellung verschiedener Facetten moderner kognitivistischer Gefühlsphilosophie kommt dabei auch die Psychologie zu Wort.

The disclosure of corporate environmental performance is an increasingly important element of a firm’s ethical behavior. We analyze how the legal origin of foreign institutional investors affects a firm’s voluntary greenhouse gas emissions disclosure. Using a large sample of firms from 36 countries, we show that foreign institutional ownership from civil law countries improves the scope and quality of a firm’s greenhouse gas emissions reporting. This relation is robust to addressing endogeneity and selection biases. The effect is more pronounced in (...) firms from non-climate-sensitized countries, for which the gap between firms’ environmental standards and investors’ environmental targets is potentially larger, and in less international firms. Firms with a higher level of voluntary greenhouse gas emissions disclosure also exhibit higher valuations. (shrink)

Bayesian psychology, in what is perhaps its most familiar version, is incomplete: Jeffrey conditionalization is not a complete account of rational belief change. Jeffrey conditionalization is sensitive to the order in which the evidence arrives. This order effect can be so pronounced as to call for a belief adjustment that cannot be understood as an assimilation of incoming evidence by Jeffrey's rule. Hartry Field's reparameterization of Jeffrey's rule avoids the order effect but fails as an account of how new evidence (...) should be assimilated. (shrink)

Many theodicists have maintained that God is justified in permitting suffering on the ground that His doing so is a necessary condition of the realization of certain intrinsically valuable ends which the suffering serves and whose value outweighs the suffering which occasions them. Examples of ends which are frequently cited in this connection are freely chosen actions in accordance with stringent obligations to be charitable and steadfast. To say that the value of these ends outweighs the suffering which gives rise (...) to them is to say that the existence both of these ends and of suffering is better than the non-existence of both. (shrink)

The author argues for a Collingwoodian claim: if an emotion is expressed in art, it is not a content which exists prior to, and independent of, its expression. Artistic emotion expressions rather clarify and complete emotions. The autor backs up this claim by Musil’s Lewinian theory of emotion which displays significant parallels to recent Enactivist Theories of Emotion: it states that embodiment in action is necessary in any case in order for nonspecific dispositions to emotions to shape and consolidate into (...) specific fully fledged, genuine emotions. Two ways of shaping and consolidating are distinguished. One way is to categorise emotions in terms of their so-called “formal objects” by associating nonspecific dispositions to emotions via action with specific paradigm scenarios. Another way is to put these categories to the test by expressing exemplary individual experiences which go beyond the existing repertoire of paradigm scenarios. Art, when it expresses emotions, shapes and consolidates in the second way. Art challenges the existing system of emotion types which is at the same time to challenge the corresponding system of evaluations and values. The presented argument draws upon the notions of expressing developed by Dorit Bar-On and Philipp J. Koch. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on Findlay & Walker's model and more specifically, on its underestimation of the role of cognitive processes in eye movement control during complex activities such as text scanning. In particular, the issue of the complexity of the subject's task/behavior is discussed to stress the importance of the link between selection for perceptual processing on the one hand, and the selection of a target for a saccade, on the other. Future models will have to account for the fact (...) that the goal of any saccade is to bring the eyes to a relevant object and that the selection of this saccade target is closely related to object recognition. (shrink)

Evaluativism about desire, the view that desires just are, or necessarily involve, positive evaluations of their objects, currently enjoys widespread popularity in many philosophical circles. This chapter argues that evaluativism, in both of its doxastic and perceptual versions, overstates and mischaracterises the connection between desires and evaluations. Whereas doxastic evaluativism implausibly rules out cases where someone has a desire, despite evaluating its object negatively, being uncertain about its value, or having no doxastic attitude whatsoever towards its evaluative status at all, (...) perceptual evaluativism cannot even properly apply to the large class of standing desires. It is also argued that evaluativism about desire is not even well-motivated in the first place: the theory is supposed to solve a particular puzzle about the role desires play in the explanation of action, yet, in fact, it does not offer any help whatsoever in dealing with the relevant puzzle. (shrink)